LJK/Security Reference Manual


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DEFOUTACC

Determine whether presence of DECnet Default Outgoing Account conforms to policy.

Violation reports

Constraint Nature of the violation
PROHIBITED DECnet Default Outgoing Account is present in violation of policy
REQUIRED DECnet Default Outgoing Account is absent in violation of policy

Description

A DECnet default outgoing account is an older form of default DECnet account which involves storing a password for one node on another node. It is thus even less secure than the DECnet default incoming account, without providing the added features of the DECnet default privileged account.
Default policy Use of a DECnet default outgoing account is prohibited. Customizing Exemptions for this type of default DECnet account should be granted very unwillingly. This is a very old and very insecure mechanism. selector

Limits

Constraint Value Default
PROHIBITED FALSE or TRUE TRUE
REQUIRED FALSE or TRUE FALSE

Exemptions

Constraint Value Parameters
PROHIBITED FALSE or TRUE <node>
REQUIRED FALSE or TRUE <node>
Practical considerations In almost all cases, use of proxy logins or object-specific accounts can remove the need for general default DECnet accounts.

DEFPRVACC

Determine whether presence of DECnet Default Privileged Account conforms to policy.

Violation reports

Constraint Nature of the violation
PROHIBITED DECnet Default Privileged Account is present in violation of policy
REQUIRED DECnet Default Privileged Account is absent in violation of policy

Description

DECnet default privileged accounts are implemented by storing the password to one node on another node, and transmitting that password on behalf of the user if certain privileges are held. It is most often used for special-purpose applications or in system management.
Default policy Use of a DECnet default privileged account is prohibited. Customizing Exemptions may be in order if a particular application is using this sort of default DECnet account in a meaningful way. There are certain features of this account which can enhance security, but designs should be reviewed with an expert to look for alternative implementation methods. selector

Limits

Constraint Value Default
PROHIBITED FALSE or TRUE TRUE
REQUIRED FALSE or TRUE FALSE

Exemptions

Constraint Value Parameters
PROHIBITED FALSE or TRUE <node>
REQUIRED FALSE or TRUE <node>
Practical considerations Only one application can use the full power of this feature in most situations.

FALPOOROUT

Ensure that usage of FAL routing conforms to local policy.

Violation reports

Constraint Nature of the violation
PROHIBITED FAL Poor Man's Routing is enabled in violation of policy
REQUIRED FAL Poor Man's Routing is disabled in violation of policy

Description

Poor man's routing through FAL is used when a user provides multiple node specifications in a filespec, such as:


NODE1::NODE2::DISK$USER:[SMITH]FINANCE.DAT 
It can be used to circumvent normal access paths in some situations.

If the DECnet FAL object finds logical name FAL$LOG to contain the substring "/DISABLE=8", poor man's routing will be prevented.

Default policy Use of poor man's routing is prohibited. Customizing The need for poor man's routing went away with the introduction of DECnet Phase 3, so exemptions here do not seem a good idea. selector

Limits

Constraint Value Default
PROHIBITED FALSE or TRUE TRUE
REQUIRED FALSE or TRUE FALSE

Exemptions

Constraint Value Parameters
PROHIBITED FALSE or TRUE <node>
REQUIRED FALSE or TRUE <node>
Practical considerations This test covers only provision of a system-wide logical name FAL$LOG.

The logical name FAL$LOG is interpreted in the context of each FAL server process, and there is no requirement that logical names be in executive mode, so an individual user can override the FAL$LOG value specified on a system-wide basis. This mechanism is useful, however, for accounts where a user does not have interactive access or the ability to define logical names.

This feature of FAL$LOG is not documented and supported by VMS Development. Although VMS Development has gone to some trouble to implement it, they reserve the right to change or remove the feature at any time.

6.4 DEVICE tests

Tests in the DEVICE facility deal with all devices, although some give different treatment to disks and terminals (for which there are separate tests).

Exemptions are based on node name and device name.


ACLIDENT

Ensure that identifier types used in access control lists conform to policy.

Violation reports

Constraint Nature of the violation
NOGENERAL General identifier used in violation of policy
NOSYSTEM System-defined identifier used in violation of policy
NOUIC UIC identifier used in violation of policy

Description

Use of UIC identifiers directly in access control lists leads to problems if user responsibilities are changed, since control of the access they have been granted is distributed throughout the system.

The purpose of this test is to ensure that identifiers used in Identifier Access Control Entries are of acceptable types.

Default policy By default, identifiers in ACLs must not be UIC identifiers. Customizing The options of prohibiting General and System identifiers are provided for flexibility, but are not useful in most circumstances. The main customization which might be desired is to remove the prohibition against the use of UIC identifiers. selector

Limits

Constraint Value Default
NOGENERAL FALSE or TRUE FALSE
NOSYSTEM FALSE or TRUE FALSE
NOUIC FALSE or TRUE TRUE

Exemptions

Constraint Value Parameters
NOGENERAL FALSE or TRUE <node>, <device-name>
NOSYSTEM FALSE or TRUE <node>, <device-name>
NOUIC FALSE or TRUE <node>, <device-name>
Practical considerations In cases where existing use of UIC identifiers is pervasive temporary customization might be required.

OWNER

Ensure that ownership of devices is retained by the system and not by an individual user, except when the device is in use.

Violation reports

Constraint Nature of the violation
WRONG Device owner is not the system

Description

If an individual user account gains ownership of a device, it also gains access to any information that is stored on it or transmitted through it. A particular concern is the case of terminal ports, in which this ownership would allow one user to read another user's password as it is typed. Another concern is that other users would be unable to use a device owned by an individual user, even when the ownership is acquired inadvertently.

The purpose of this test is to ensure that the system retains ownership of devices that are not in use. This test checks the ownership of any device not currently in use and reports any instance in which the owner is not the system.

For limits only (not exemptions), owner matching string of [SYSTEM] will match (as a special case) against UIC's which are represented as [1,4] (due, for instance, to absence of a rights database).

Default policy By default, every idle device must be owned by the system. Customizing An alternative owner can be specified for any device by setting an exemption. It is also possible to change the standard owner to be some account other than the system, by changing the limit for this test. selector

Limits

Constraint Value Default
WRONG Identifier [SYSTEM]

Exemptions

Constraint Value Parameters
WRONG Identifier <node>, <device-name>
Practical considerations Device ownership and protection must be considered jointly.

PROTECTION

Ensure that each device's protection setting meets the minimum setting defined by policy.

Violation reports

Constraint Nature of the violation
ABSOLUTLO Access is narrower than permitted by policy
ABSOLUTHI Access is wider than permitted by policy
PERCENTLO Fewer users can access than permitted by policy
PERCENTHI More users can access than permitted by policy

Description

Under VMS, a protection setting can be applied to a device in the same way that it can be applied to files. This allows a given user (or group of users) to have exclusive access to a given disk, for example. Conversely, it can be set to keep a device open for access by all users, or to limit them to read access.

The purpose of this test is to ensure that the protection settings for devices remain at the levels established by policy.

The ABSOLUTLO and ABSOLUTHI tests measure the UIC-based protection mask directly. The PERCENTLO and PERCENTHI tests measure the result of protection (including ACL protection) in terms of the percentage of usernames given access.

Default policy By default, the protection setting for each device must allow at least the system read, write, logical, and physical access. At most, it will allow all users read, write, logical, and physical access.

By default, a minimum of 0 percent of users must have access and a maximum of 10 percent of users may have access. Customizing The default limit values for these tests leave device protection "wide open", so changes should be made to obtain any value from this test. selector Limits for constraints PERCENTLO and PERCENTHI can take a selector consisting of a VMS device access type: READ, WRITE, LOGICAL, PHYSICAL or CONTROL. If no selector is specified, customization commands apply to all possible selector values.

Limits

Constraint Value Default
ABSOLUTLO Any Protection (S,O:RWPL,G,W)
ABSOLUTHI Any Protection (S:RWPL,O:RWPL,G:RWPL,W:RWPL)
PERCENTLO 0-100 0
PERCENTHI 0-100 10

Exemptions

Constraint Value Parameters
ABSOLUTLO Any Protection <node>, <device-name>
ABSOLUTHI Any Protection <node>, <device-name>
PERCENTLO 0-100 <node>, <device-name>
PERCENTHI 0-100 <node>, <device-name>
Practical considerations Volume protection for disks and tapes also controls access.

6.5 DISK Tests

Tests in the DISK facility deal with overall disk volume security and individual file security.

Exemptions are based on node name and volume name or file specification.

Disk served by the Distributed File Service product from HP (DECdfs) will not be tested on the client machine, but only on the serving machine. This is different from the approach taken with MSCP served disks in a cluster, because in the cluster situation a common security domain is present and testing file ownership and protection is meaningful. In the DFS case, all access is via proxy logins, so testing file ownership and protection can only be done from the serving machine.

In cases where a violation is detected on a file which happens to be the target of alias directory entries, the violation is reported only for the main file specification.

The following elements are tested in concert:

Each file encountered is tested under one and only one of those elements. The FILEPROT element covers files which do not fit one of the other categories.

In the case of CD-ROM disks, the ABSOLUTLO, ABSOLUTHI and PERCENTHI constraints are tested with compensation for the fact that the disk cannot be written. In the case of the PERCENTLO constraint, however, no such compensation is made, so there will be violations reported if access percentages (for Write and Delete) calculated from nominal file protections are less than specified in the policy, even though a different setting would not change the actual protection of the CD-ROM files. This approach is taken to avoid a situation where two tests would provide conflicting reports as to the percentage of users with Write or Delete access.

That general approach to exhaustive disk file scanning is to hold files of similar nature to the same standard, adding exemptions for files allowed to exceed that standard. If you have particular files you want held to a tighter standard than others, designate them in exemptions for the CHECKPROT constraints. The CHECKPROT and CHECKSUM elements perform no processing based on the limits, but instead exclusively test files that are indicated for exemptions for their constraints.


ACLIDENT

Ensure that identifier types used in access control lists conform to policy.

Violation reports

Constraint Nature of the violation
NOGENERAL General identifier used in violation of policy
NOSYSTEM System-defined identifier used in violation of policy
NOUIC UIC identifier used in violation of policy

Description

Use of UIC identifiers directly in access control lists leads to problems if user responsibilities are changed, since control of the access they have been granted is distributed throughout the system.

The purpose of this test is to ensure that identifiers used in Identifier Access Control Entries are of acceptable types.

Default policy By default, identifiers in ACLs must not be UIC identifiers. Customizing The options of prohibiting General and System identifiers are provided for flexibility, but are not useful in most circumstances. The main customization which might be desired is to remove the prohibition against the use of UIC identifiers. selector

Limits

Constraint Value Default
NOGENERAL FALSE or TRUE FALSE
NOSYSTEM FALSE or TRUE FALSE
NOUIC FALSE or TRUE TRUE

Exemptions

Constraint Value Parameters
NOGENERAL FALSE or TRUE <node>, <device-name> or <filespec>
NOSYSTEM FALSE or TRUE <node>, <device-name> or <filespec>
NOUIC FALSE or TRUE <node>, <device-name> or <filespec>
Practical considerations In cases where existing use of UIC identifiers is pervasive temporary customization might be required.

BACKUP

Ensure that backups are performed on all disks often enough to meet policy requirements.

Violation reports

Constraint Nature of the violation
ABSOLUTHI Time since last backup exceeds the policy maximum.
MODIFIEDHI Time since last backup exceeds the policy maximum and file has been modified since backup.

Description

Backups are a necessary part of most security plans, and this test ensures that they happen at least as frequently as the local policy requires.

Violations DISK, BACKUP, ABSOLUTHI and MODIFIEDHI are not reported for files which were created since the beginning of the period during which a backup was required.

Violations DISK, BACKUP, ABSOLUTHI and MODIFIEDHI are not reported for files on CDROM disks, since even if backup were done on CDROM disks, it could not be recorded.

Default policy By default, the maximum time between backups for a disk is 30 days. Customizing The limit for this test is set by a number, which is the maximum number of days between backups.

The practical upper limit for a precise count of days since the last backup of a file is 9999 (about 27 years). Specification of any larger number is considered to be "forever", or since the earliest date which can be represented in the VMS time format.

If you are only concerned that files get backed up once (as compared with ensuring they are backed up on a regular basis to ensure that entire disk volumes can be restored), raise the limit or add exemptions for ABSOLUTHI).

A limit or exemption with a value of zero means there is no value which is considered unacceptable. selector

Limits

Constraint Value Default
ABSOLUTHI 0---n 30
MODIFIEDHI 0---n 30

Exemptions

Constraint Value Parameters
ABSOLUTHI 0---n <node>, <volume-name>
MODIFIEDHI 0---n <node>, <volume-name>
Practical considerations Many things can keep backups from happening as scheduled: holidays, oversight, preventive maintenance, hardware failures, errors in backup command procedures, etc. In many of these instances, the missed backup will be performed correctly the next day, and no harm is done. Therefore, a security manager might not want to set the limit exactly equal to the scheduled backup interval, since it will cause violations to be reported when backups might still be under control. Possibly a more comfortable setting would be a few days higher than the scheduled interval. Be careful, however, not to set this figure too high. Some sites with weekly backups have been embarrassed when they discovered that they missed backing up the same set of disks on both Christmas and New Year's Day, thus starting a new year without a full set of backups, and with a lot of year-end processing to fit into the schedule.

Testing performed for this element is based entirely on the backup date maintained by VMS. The VMS Backup program will only modify that date when the /RECORD qualifier is specified. Some sites use the /RECORD qualifier only for weekly full backups, while other sites use it for incremental backups as well. In order to fully understand the significance of backup dates it is necessary to consult with the system management staff for a particular machine to learn their procedures in this regard.


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